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The Bffects of the 'Var

on

Our Latin-American Relations.
Huntington ·1ilson

II

Turning from the opportunity to the lesson, from the comrr.ercial

and economic aspects of this question to those that e re political in
the lar3c sense, one's imagination is appalled at the potentialities
of the yet unknown results of so vast an upheaval.

Yet we must

envisage some of these if we are to be prepared for their effect
upon us.

re must be ready for the inrpact of the resultant forces

these great dynamics.

of

We must be ready everywhere, but nowhere more

than in our relations with Latin-America. in the zone of the
Caribbean, and wherever the Monroe Doctrine as still interpreted
gives us a varying degree of responsibility.
A good foreign office is said to keep a man at the front door
to answer all hyi;:othetical questions·; but it is safe to suy thnt a
good foreign minister must ask himself many such, and common prudti:nce
assuredly suggests many at this time to the United States.

The war's first effect upon our Latin-American relations is to
compel through commercial and financial

rap~rocheme~!

a larger

measure of material interdependence, more contact, and we may hope a
subati tution of knowled.ge for the former reoiproci ty of ignorance.
All this makes for better socisl a nd intellectual relations, good

understanding and friendship, and so for political relations much
more substantial in the c ase of many of the republics than the
r a ther flimsy Pan-Americanism celebrated in eloquent speeches and
futile international conferences.
~ of

th9t kind.

The.!~

There is little in Pen-Americanism

Latina of eloquence is not itself homogeneous;

still less so is the population of the whole hemisphere.

And with

Rio d.e Janeiro t :Buenos Aires, a nd 3.ant:iago, we have, of course, far
less propinquity than ·•,• e have with the c sp 1 tale of Europe.
we :reo.lly c an do is to build

u~ ,

But what

especi a lly with the nearer rer ublics,

real ties of common ir1terest and good neighborhood, and with the

distant ones ties of. commerce and esteem.

The war may tend to cure
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certain rather

aelf-~entered

countries of affecting the morbia view

that the people of the United States are lying awake nights contriving
to devour them, when in feet in most such cases it would. be r.J!ird to

find in e crowded street in the United States that one in a thousand
of the passersby knew more than the name, a.t most, of one of those
very few countries referrea to.

Europe's preocc.-upation with the war

temporarily deprives such a country and its few misguided prophets.
whose monomania is areaa. of that chimera the 1rColossus of the
Nor t~r, of the
annoying us.

p~

stiice of nestling up to Burope in the hope of

It postpones, too, the hope of the morbid ones that

we shall come to war with a pm'Terf'ul enemy.

Now, perhaps, even

these will appreciate the reirerk of a diplomatist of a certain
wea.k country in contact with European Powers. vrho once said: "If
we only hBd the United States for

~neighbor!

Vhat I can't under-

stand. is that your neighbors do not realize their good luckn.
Turning from these exoer.tional phenomena, the very :fnct of the war

leaves the United States in a general position of greater politioal

restige.
---~----

""':hatever the upshot of the European traged.y. its political and
psychological consequemes ere li.n;,ly to be great.

If it result in

new national di visi one upon racial lines of more reality. who knows
but that the awakened e_ririts o:f nut:iona.lity will germinate fresh

military ambitions?

Or will

the

ho~rors

of the war force political

reforms and the search for assurance in more democratic institutions
agai mt any repetition of those horrors?

And is populs r government

an assurance against useless war while men remain warlike even when
not military?

Exe ept from the sue cessfu.1 countries or from thoe e

where disaster has brought such soberina; change that men can return
to work heartenea with new hope, When the war is over there ie
likely to be a heavy emigra tion of disgusted people.

Possibly even

victory will be so dear thut men will emigrate from a country half
prostrate in ite triumph.

Many will come as the Puritans crune. and

as the bulk of our own excellent Germanic element came, and. ,,.. ill
J-

ca st in their lot with a ne'N nation.

e shall goat a

share, but
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douttless some vii U go to the republics of the far South, and some
to the highland.a of the tropics illl.d through the Canal to the 'Vest
Coast.

If so, this will tend gradually toward increased production

and purohasing power, as well as to\ve.rd a laa.v$ning of social,
politicul, and economic conditions of life.
If the war were indecisive or left all the combatants more or
less prostrated, peaceful

itmi igrati on

might give a big impulse

to the gred.uul growing up of powerful States in the temperate zone
of the extreme South.

The Situation there, ana the evolution of

our own power, make it perli..c:ps even now :fair to oonsid.er the

an~I\case

..._\ question of regarding as optional in

the assertion by ue

of the Monroe Doctrine much below the Equator, let us say, beyond
which it may possibly be doubtful whether we have nowadays much
reason for special interest.

But even so, our relations to South

&merica and our obligetions under the Monroe Doctrine, in spite of

the blessed fortifications of the Atlantic and Pacific

Oce~ma.

leave ue where 1 t is tenpting fate to be without a navy of the first
magnitude, and a big me.rch01t marine.
to Belgium and. Luxembourg.

"''e hsve seen what happened

\'e have seen how even some of the most

enlightened nations can still make :force their god.
learn slowly, end there are
lLre China.

perh~ps

Nations

eome new big ones comin5 on,

As liorman lngell, a very judicious peace advocate, lays

down, if all the peace doctrines are true, nevertheless it would be
madbess to go unarmed until all nations believed them and could be
relied upon to act up to them.

The war's lesson to us is that a

very big navy, and a very good di plomaoy, rather than a lot of
us in our

If the war i a a fight to a finish, and the allies triumph,
we can imagine Russia, with its teeming millions of people, occupied
for a vhile in the Near East; Japan consol idating her position in
the Far East, an increasingly powerful neighbor to ua in the
Philipp.ines, the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Ocean; France

-4st ill a groat Power; and En 0 land as a

VJO

rld Power of uncomfortebly

' ubiquitous strength, able to c hull c r..ge the Monroe Doctrine et will.

Or, let us SUJJpose tr.at Germany should triumph end that German
emigration should swerm into the Caribbean countries, or into
Brazil or some other country where there is already a large German
colony,- elated, triumrhant Germans, not Germans disLueteQ by a

disastrous war.

Would

Ger~any

Doctrine, or would it be only

er the dangerously

be likely to heed the Uonroe
i~nother

~re1) onderant

11

scrai: of paperri?

.~ nd

consid-

world power that would be G·ermany'

a:

The Canadian neighborhoo a, the kinship, the racisl or language

congeniality. might enable us always to get on with the British,
and conceivably so.me day to cooperate in a proper case with them,
a nd porhaps others, in putting force at the service of peaceful

aspiration.

Upon this hypothesis no less, we have the same naval

necessities "·'h ile we quietly cultivate our general interests and
our Latin- merican relations, and maintain e conservative allofnesa
from c omni tm.ents which may be :proposea as a result of Europe's
self-inflicted tragedy.

In the present stage of civilization the safety of Ame rice
should not be left de r.endent up on the forbearance of any Power that
may emerge dengerously strong
arise.

fro~

the war or that may otherwise

The obliga tions and. rights of our Latin-Ame rte on relations,

under the Monroe Doctrine and otherwise, like our security and our
efficiency s.e a force for i::eace end good in the world, demend a

big nsvyt a merchant marine, and the self-discipline end safeguard

of adequate military preperedness.
diplomacy of intelligent

The need of these and of a

self-intere~t,

continuity, end intense

nationalism, is the lee son brought home to us by the

uropean

ar

in its effects upon our Latin-.tlmeric:rnn relations as well as u.p on
our general position as a great Power.

Carscast November 21, 1914.

